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Abstract 
Social media networks have democratized the power of mass communication. One less 
laudable consequence of this development is, however, that individuals are at a much greater 
risk of committing defamation than existed under traditional media, which would generally 
exercise editorial control. The legal problems associated with defamation on social media are 
made more complex by the fact that through the internet in general and social media in 
particular communications will readily cross borders. Where a communication crosses 
borders, the question of the applicable law arises – whose law should govern whether the 
communication gives rise to an actionable claim for defamation? This is a problem which is 
addressed by rules of private international law, in particular through choice of law rules. This 
chapter examines the rules which apply in the English courts to determine which national law 
governs cross-border claims in defamation, considering whether a special rule should apply 
for online defamation, and whether the problems raised by social media require further 
specialized regulation. In so doing, it also analyses why the applicable rules, which were 
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developed in the nineteenth century, have proven so resistant to modernisation in the face of 
the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social media networks have democratized the power of mass communication, an exhilarating 
development which challenges the control of governments and traditional media magnates 
over the spread of new ideas. In so doing, these new forms of communication have also 
(unsurprisingly) created new legal problems, perhaps most prominently in relation to 
cyberbullying, hate speech, and the promotion of terrorism. Another evident consequence of 
these developments is that individuals are at a much greater risk of committing defamation 
than existed under traditional media, which would generally exercise editorial control where 
individuals were publishing material to a wide audience. This risk is particularly strong 
because the general style of communication online through social media is informal and 
casual, and thus the impact of a communication will not necessarily be judged as lightly as it 
may have been intended (or hoped).1 It is true that not all online communication is intended 
to be ephemeral – a much valued feature of social media is the rise in ‘citizen journalism’. In 
general, however, there is a mis-match between the popular perception of online 
communications, often likened to ‘chatting’, and the legal perception, which is that any tweet 
or Facebook post is as much a publication as a traditional newspaper article.2 
 
                                              
1 The Court in McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB), for example, was unpersuaded that the inclusion 
of the words ‘*innocent face*’ as part of the tweet concerned indicated anything other than insincerity. The 
online and casual context of a communication may, however, be taken into consideration in interpreting the 
words used: see eg Thompson v James [2013] EWHC 515 (QB), [270]. 
2 Further discussion on this point is found in David Mangan, Chapter XX in this volume.  
  
 
 
The legal problems associated with defamation on social media are made more complex by 
the fact that through the internet in general and social media in particular communications 
will readily cross borders. Where a communication crosses borders, the question of the 
applicable law arises – whose law should govern whether the communication gives rise to an 
actionable claim for defamation? All defamation law seeks to balance the rights of speakers 
with the rights of reputation of those about whom they speak – but what if the speaker and 
their subject live in different jurisdictions which strike this balance in different ways? 
 
This is a problem which is addressed by rules of private international law, in particular 
through choice of law rules. This chapter examines the rules which apply in the English 
courts to determine which national law governs cross-border claims in defamation, 
considering whether a special rule should apply for online defamation, and whether the 
problems raised by social media require further specialized regulation. It also explains why 
the applicable rules, which were developed in the nineteenth century, have proven so resistant 
to modernisation. 
 
 
2. The double-actionability rule 
The traditional choice of law rule in tort in English law – which still applies to choice of law 
in defamation today – was established in 1870, in Phillips v Eyre.3 This case arose out of 
claims against Edward John Eyre, who served as colonial Governor of Jamaica. Faced with 
an uprising known as the Morant Bay Rebellion, he used brutal force to suppress the 
protestors, then passed a law giving himself immunity. Eyre’s conduct became a cause 
                                              
3 Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1. See further generally Peter Handford, ‘Edward John Eyre and the Conflict 
of Laws’ (2008) 32 Melb UL Rev 822. 
  
 
 
célèbre, and although no criminal proceedings were forthcoming when he returned to 
England, parties involved with the rebellion brought civil proceedings for assault and false 
imprisonment against him.4 
 
Although this was a private law claim, it evidently had an intensely public character and 
context. These somewhat unusual facts gave rise to a somewhat unusual choice of law rule. 
The court held: 
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been 
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such 
a character that it would have been actionable if committed in England ... Secondly, 
the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.5 
In so doing, the court hybridized two traditional influences on choice of law in tort – the first 
viewing tort law as comparable to criminal law,6 and thus as a matter of public law governed 
by the law of the forum, and the second viewing tort law as a matter of territorial conduct 
regulation.7 What is perhaps unique about this rule is that it insists on the application of both 
principles, requiring that liability be established under both sets of laws, the lex fori (law of 
the forum) and the lex loci delicti (law of the place of the tort) – thus it is widely known as 
the rule of ‘double-actionability’. 
 
                                              
4 Lead counsel for the claimants was John Richard Quain, a fellow of University College in London, after 
whom, together with his brother, the Quain professorships at UCL are named. 
5 Phillips v. Eyre (n 3) 28. The claims failed because this second requirement was defeated by Eyre’s immunity. 
6 As the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission expressed it: 
the law of tort and delict was formerly seen, much more than it is today, as having a punitive rather 
than a compensatory function. As such it was more closely allied to criminal law, an area of the law 
where there is no question of a court in this country applying anything other than the domestic law of 
England or Scotland 
Joint Report of the Law Commission (No 193) and the Scottish Law Commission (No 129) on ‘Private 
International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict’ (1990) [2.6]  
<www.bailii.org/ew/other/EWLC/1990/193.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016.  
7 See further eg Symeon Symeonides, ‘Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity’ (2008) 56 Am J  
Comp L 173, 188. 
  
 
 
The rule established in Phillips v Eyre has received two significant further developments by 
the courts. In Boys v Chaplin,8 the House of Lords held that exceptionally the double-
actionability requirement could be disapplied in favour of the exclusive application of 
English law. While not quite expressed in this way, arguably the real reasoning behind this 
decision was that the two parties were English, and the key issue in the proceedings was the 
question of the allocation of loss between those parties. The court thus accepted the influence 
of a third idea of tort law as concerned with loss-distribution, principally developed in the 
United States,9 and indeed the court cited to the leading US authorities which had developed 
that idea.10 In Red Sea Insurance Co v Bouygues SA,11 the Privy Council held that a claim in 
tort brought before the courts of Hong Kong arising out of problems with construction work 
in Saudi Arabia could be governed exclusively by the law of Saudi Arabia – thus, by the law 
of the place of the tort rather than the law of the forum. The court held that this exception 
should be based on whether the law of the place of the tort had the ‘most significant 
relationship’ with the claim.12  
 
These developments left the traditional common law choice of law rule in tort in a somewhat 
confused position, at least when it comes to identifying the underlying principle or approach 
– perhaps reflecting the range of competing views about the function of tort law itself. While 
the starting point remains the rule of double-actionability, which suggests a combination of 
viewing tort as having a public regulatory function as well as being concerned with conduct 
regulation, flexible exceptions may point exclusively toward the law of the place of the tort or 
the common law of the parties, suggesting a concern with loss distribution. Which of these 
                                              
8 Boys v Chaplin [1969] 2 All ER 1085. 
9 See Symeonides (n 7) 188. 
10 [1969] 2 All ER 1085, 1102ff. 
11 Red Sea Insurance Co v Bouygues SA [1995] 1 AC 190. 
12 ibid 206. 
  
 
 
approaches is adopted – which principle prevails – is largely left to the courts to resolve on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
As noted above, this complex double-actionability rule continues to apply to claims for 
defamation brought before the English courts today, which may suggest a similar uncertainty 
regarding the function of defamation law. But the significance of this fact needs to be 
understood within a broader context, in which defamation has been specifically excluded 
from both UK and EU reforms to choice of law in tort. The following section discusses these 
reforms, and considers why it was viewed as inappropriate for them to encompass choice of 
law in defamation and why no alternative reformed rule has been adopted. 
 
 
3. Reforms to choice of law in tort 
3.1. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 
The double-actionability rule provides, at least as a starting point, that English law should be 
applied to any tort, regardless of where in the world it was committed. It has been subject to 
widespread criticism as being ‘chauvinist’ and ‘parochial’.13 Another way of expressing this 
criticism is that the ‘public’ function of tort law, which had historically justified the 
application of the lex fori by analogy to criminal law, was increasingly challenged. The 
judicial modification of the rule through the development of a flexible exception did not do 
enough to address these concerns, which led finally to a 1995 UK statutory reform. As noted 
above, defamation was excluded from this statutory regulation (section 13). A brief 
                                              
13 See eg Joint Report of the Law Commission (No 193) and the Scottish Law Commission (No 129) (n 6) [2.7]. 
  
 
 
explanation of the approach of the Act is still, however, helpful if we are to understand the 
reasons for this exclusion (discussed further in section 3.3 below). 
 
The Act essentially established a two-stage test for determining the law applicable to a tort. 
Section 11(1) established the general rule, ‘that the applicable law is the law of the country in 
which the events constituting the tort or delict in question occur’; offering further guidance in 
section 11(2) on how that law should be determined where ‘elements of those events occur in 
different countries’. Essentially, the basic rule adopted is a lex loci delicti rule – the law of 
the place of the tort. The second stage of the test, set out in section 12, provided for a flexible 
exception, under which a different law may be applied if this appears substantially more 
appropriate on the basis of a comparison of the connecting factors between the tort and 
different countries. In practice the courts have tended to use this exception principally for 
cases in which the relationship between the parties is centred around a different legal order. 
In Edmunds v Simmonds,14 for example, two English parties were involved in a car accident 
in Spain while on holiday there. The court found that English law should be applicable, 
emphasising that both parties were English, and that most of the damages were suffered in 
England.  
 
Two key features of the 1995 Act might therefore be identified. The first is that it abandons 
any prioritisation of the law of the forum, and thus rejects any ‘public’ dimension to choice of 
law in tort.15 The second is that it does not strictly decide between a conduct regulating or 
loss distributing approach. While the former is adopted as the most general rule, through the 
application of the lex loci delicti, the flexible exception allows the court to determine that a 
                                              
14 Edmunds v Simmonds [2001] 1 WLR 1003. 
15 Although under section 14(3)(a)(i) the courts retain a discretion to refuse the application of foreign law which 
is contrary to forum public policy. 
  
 
 
dispute, or an issue in a dispute, is more appropriately regulated by a different law, including 
where that issue concerns questions of loss allocation between parties whose relationship is 
centred in a different legal order. 
 
3.2. The Rome II Regulation (2007) 
Regulation of choice of law in tort has long been on the agenda of the European Union. The 
Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations16 was finally enacted 
on 11 July 2007, coming into force from 11 January 2009 and applying to events which arose 
after that date.17 Defamation was, however, excluded from the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation, under Article 1(2)(g), alongside violations of privacy.18 Although not the main 
focus of this chapter, it is notable that the English Court of Appeal recently recognised a tort 
of ‘misuse of private information’.19 The recognition was for jurisdictional purposes, but the 
court suggested that this may also affect the characterisation of the cause of action in the 
context of choice of law. This new cause of action has developed from the law on breach of 
confidence, which is generally classified as restitutionary rather than delictual.20 If, however, 
it has indeed evolved into a tort, claims for misuse of private information are likely to be 
covered by the Rome II Regulation exclusion, and fall within the scope of the 1995 Act. 
  
The exclusion of defamation and privacy from the Rome II Regulation is intended to be 
temporary, and Article 30(2) of the Regulation required the Commission to carry out a study 
                                              
16 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’) [2007] OJ L 199/40. 
17 The date of commencement of the Regulation was unclear until settled in C-412/10 Homawoo v GMF 
Assurances SA (CJEU, 17 November 2011). 
18 Claims in ‘privacy’ are not excluded from the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
Although a tort of ‘breach of privacy’ has not traditionally been part of English law, a claim may be brought 
before the English courts if it is governed by a foreign law which recognises such a tort. 
19 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (appeal to the Supreme Court pending). 
20 Kitechnology BV v Unicor GmbH [1995] IL Pr 568. 
  
 
 
on choice of law in the context of privacy and defamation no later than 31 December 2008, 
duly completed in February 2009 and consisting largely of a comparative analysis of existing 
choice of law rules applicable to privacy and defamation in the Member States.21 Despite 
prompting from the European Parliament,22 as discussed further below, the Commission has 
not yet taken any further steps in the matter. 
 
Although not applicable to defamation, the approach of the new general choice of law rule in 
tort, set out in Article 4 of the Regulation, is again worth noting. Article 4(1) specifies that a 
tort is generally governed by the law of the place of the tort, which is defined as the place in 
which direct damage is suffered. Article 4(2) specifies that this general rule is displaced in 
favour of the law of common habitual residence of the parties, should they have one. Finally, 
Article 4(3) specifies that if another law is ‘manifestly more closely connected’ than the law 
chosen under Article 4(1) or (2), which may particularly be the case where the parties have a 
pre-existing contractual relationship governed by a different law, then that law applies 
instead. The effect is a rule which combines a number of the elements and considerations 
examined in this chapter, not greatly dissimilar to that adopted under the 1995 Act in the 
United Kingdom – accepting and mediating uncertainly between the possibility of giving 
effect to the law of the place of the tort or the law common to the parties (or another law), but 
excluding any necessary role for the law of the forum, as is provided for under the traditional 
common law double-actionability rule.  
 
                                              
21 Commission, ‘Comparative Study on the Situation in the 27 Member States as regards the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations Arising out of Violations of Privacy and Rights relating to Personality’ (Final 
Report) JLS/2007/C4/028 (February 2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/study_privacy_en.pdf> 
accessed 3 June 2016.  
22 See, eg, European Parliament, ‘Question for Written Answer to the Commission by Cecilia Wikström 
(ALDE) - Subject: Inclusion of Libel Law under Rome II’ [2014] OJ C 6E/1, p 191 (English version) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2013-002703&language=EN> accessed 3 
June 2016.  
  
 
 
3.3. The exclusion of defamation from statutory reform 
The history examined above leaves us with a simple fact – defamation has thus far been 
excluded from reforms in the field of choice of law in tort, leaving it governed by a double-
actionability rule which has been widely criticised for being parochial and chauvinist. This 
section explores two possible explanations for this exclusion – one pragmatic, and the other a 
point of principle. 
 
The pragmatic explanation is that the double-actionability rule works in favour of English 
media organisations. The effect of the double-actionability rule is that the defendant gets the 
benefit of two sets of defences if proceedings are brought against them in England in relation 
to allegations of defamation in a foreign state. For English media organisations, this 
essentially means that, at least so far as proceedings against them in England are concerned, 
English law acts as a ceiling of liability, but does not exclude the possibility that liability may 
indeed be diminished further if they publish in a foreign jurisdiction (such as that of the 
United States) which places greater emphasis on freedom of speech. To put this another way, 
double-actionability effectively means that where defamation proceedings are brought in 
England relating to foreign conduct, whichever system of law has the higher standard of free 
speech is applicable.23 
 
The point of principle is that the scope of the law of defamation is part of what defines the 
contours of a legal system’s rights of free speech, including political discourse. The reform 
efforts in the 1995 Act and the Rome II Regulation both shifted tort law away from its 
historic associations with criminal law (and the application of the lex fori), toward viewing it 
                                              
23 While English substantive defamation law is generally considered to be pro-claimant, English choice of law 
rules for defamation may thus curiously be considered pro-defendant. 
  
 
 
more as purely private law, subject to the same considerations of legal pluralism between 
states which justify choice of law rules more generally.24 The continuation of the double-
actionability rule in the context of defamation may thus be a defensible reflection of the 
distinct public implications of defamation law. The on-going application of a nineteenth 
century choice of law rule to defamation might be considered not anachronistic but 
appropriate on the basis that the law of defamation distinctively engages public regulatory 
interests in a way which is consistent with (otherwise arguably outmoded25) nineteenth 
century understandings of the function of tort law in general. 
 
The evident risk of insisting on the application of English law in every case (at least as a 
minimum standard) is an over-application of English policies, exporting or projecting them 
unreasonably by applying them to a foreign context. It is not clear, for example, why an 
English media organisation which publishes a newspaper distributed exclusively in a foreign 
state should be able to rely on the protection (at least presumed) of English law under the 
double-actionability rule, if sued in England for defamation. While these questions may be 
difficult, a choice of law rule which engaged with the issue of which political community was 
targeted or affected by a communication would seem a more sensitive response to the 
problem of determining which law should govern disputes concerning cross-border 
defamation.  
 
                                              
24 See generally Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP 2009) 5. 
25 But see eg John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs’ (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 917; 
Matthew Dyson (ed), Unravelling Tort and Crime (CUP, 2014).  
  
 
 
3.4. A European proposal? 
In May 2012, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament proposed (as an 
amendment to the Rome II Regulation) a new choice of law rule which would offer a clearly 
more sophisticated tool than the blunt double-actionability rule, providing that: 
 
1.        The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a violation of 
privacy or rights relating to the personality, including defamation, shall be the law of 
the country in which the most significant element or elements of the loss or damage 
occur or are likely to occur. 
 
2.        However, the law applicable shall be the law of the country in which the 
defendant is habitually resident if he or she could not reasonably have foreseen 
substantial consequences of his or her act occurring in the country designated by 
paragraph 1. 
 
3.        Where the violation is caused by the publication of printed matter or by a 
broadcast, the country in which the most significant element or elements of the 
damage occur or are likely to occur shall be deemed to be the country to which the 
publication or broadcasting service is principally directed or, if this is not apparent, 
the country in which editorial control is exercised, and that country’s law shall be 
applicable. The country to which the publication or broadcast is directed shall be 
determined in particular by the language of the publication or broadcast or by sales or 
  
 
 
audience size in a given country as a proportion of total sales or audience size or by a 
combination of those factors.26 
 
The public policy defence (already established under Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation) 
would offer a safety net to this rule, permitting the continued application of the legal 
standards of the forum where the foreign laws are contrary to fundamental values.  
 
While European regulation of these issues is not necessarily a desirable prospect given the 
different traditions of free speech protection in the various Member States,27 this proposal 
certainly represented an effort to engage with the competing policy issues and concerns 
which is far more sophisticated than the double-actionability rule. That is not to say that the 
proposed rule cannot be subject to criticism. Under subsection (1), the rule provides for the 
possibility that the law of the place of the loss or damage might apply, regardless of where 
the defendant acted, thus risking an over-application of the law of the place where material is 
received and read.28 Under subsection (2), the rule provides that the law of the defendant’s 
own habitual residence might apply, risking an under-application of the law of the place 
where material is received and read and the claimant’s reputation damaged. The concept of 
the ‘reasonable foreseeability’ of ‘substantial consequences’ of the act occurring in the place 
of damage is relied on to demarcate cases which should fall under the first rule rather than the 
second, although little guidance is provided as to what these terms might mean. It is not clear 
that the test of reasonable foreseeability fully engages with the concerns regarding the 
                                              
26 European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the amendment 
of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) 
(2009/2170(INI)) 2013/C 261 E/03, <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-
2012-0152&format=XML&language=EN> accessed 3 June 2016.  
27 The significance of this point may, however, be reducing with the increased role of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Charter of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on these issues. 
28 It is not clear whether the damage concerned would be the entire loss or only the loss claimed in the 
proceedings – the latter would raise greater concerns. 
  
 
 
extraterritorial application of the claimant’s home law, and the risk that this might have a 
chilling effect on free speech in other jurisdictions.  
 
For publication of printed matter or broadcast material, the place of most significant damage 
is presumed to be the place at which the publication was principally directed, which (if not 
apparent) is presumed to be the place in which editorial control is exercised.29 The 
countervailing risk thus arises that print publishers or broadcasters may unduly benefit from 
these rules. Publishers directing their publications to more than one jurisdiction are free to 
establish themselves in a jurisdiction with very strong free speech protection, as it is their 
(favourable) home law which is presumptively applied. Alternatively, publishers directing 
their publications principally to a jurisdiction with very strong free speech protection may 
benefit from the fact that the law of principal publication governs even if a claimant suffers 
reputational damage through substantial publication in another place. Analysis of the 
European Parliament proposal thus highlights the difficult and complex balancing of interests 
involved in this issue – a balance which is arguably even more difficult when publication 
takes place online or through social media, as discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
4. Choice of law in defamation online 
This chapter now focuses its attention on the way that choice of law in defamation operates in 
the online context, both as a matter of current law and as a matter of possible reform. 
 
                                              
29 The concept of a ‘principally directed’ broadcast has been considered in other contexts by the CJEU – see eg 
Case C-23/93 TV 10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media [1994] ECR I-4795. 
  
 
 
4.1. The application of the double-actionability rule 
As examined above, the choice of law rule applicable for questions of defamation which arise 
before the English courts, including defamation online, remains the common law double-
actionability rule. Defamation online is thus a twenty first century problem which strikingly 
remains regulated by a nineteenth century choice of law rule.30 This rule at least starts from 
the position that the governing law is both English law and the law of the place of the tort. 
Fixing a territorial location to a tort is thus an essential part of applying this rule, as it would 
be for any lex loci delicti rule.  
 
The case law dealing with defamation ‘offline’ establishes that the location of a tort of 
defamation, for choice of law purposes, is considered to be the place where the material is 
received and read.31 In applying this rule to online communications, the courts have firmly 
established in a series of cases that where material is published through the internet, the tort 
occurs where it is ‘downloaded’ – that is, at the location of the reader or recipient.32 In King v 
Lewis,33 for example, the allegedly defamatory character of text uploaded to a website in 
California and subsequently downloaded in England would be judged according to English 
law, as each English download was a publication which occurred in England, and the 
proceedings only claimed in relation to damage to reputation in England. The fact that 
material published on the internet may be downloaded almost anywhere in the world may 
thus, in legal terms, give rise to innumerable publications in different jurisdictions,34 each of 
                                              
30 See, for example, The Bussey Law Firm PC v Page [2015] EWHC 563 (QB).  
31 Church of Scientology of California v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police (1976) 120 SJ 690. See also eg 
Bata v Bata (1948) 92 SJ 574. 
32 See eg Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd (Application to Strike Out) [2001] QB 201; Loutchansky v Times 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2001] EMLR 36. 
33 King v Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329. 
34 There are more ‘jurisdictions’ than there are states, because many federal systems leave private law regulation 
to their provinces.  
  
 
 
which may be governed by different laws (in conjunction with English law, under the double-
actionability rule).35 
 
4.2. Alternative choice of law rules for online defamation? 
The issue of the applicable law for defamation online thus appears to raise particular 
problems, or at least particularly serious examples of general problems, and it might thus be 
suggested that a special choice of law rule should be adopted.36 There are a limited number of 
connecting factors which could be relied on to establish such a rule. A territorial rule could 
point to the place of damage, the place where the publisher acted, or perhaps the place where 
the publisher directed their actions. Alternatively, a choice of law rule could point to the 
home law of the claimant or the defendant, or (as under Article 4(2) of the Rome II 
Regulation) the law of both if this coincides. However, on closer examination each of these 
options can easily be subject to criticism. 
 
For cross-border defamation online, any territorial rule pointing to the law of the place of the 
tort (including the current common law double-actionability rule, which does so in 
conjunction with the law of the forum) does not appear to be entirely satisfactory from the 
position of either claimants or defendants. Traditionally under the common law (as examined 
above), a potentially defamatory communication will be ‘located’ at the place it is received 
and read, meaning that a large number of torts may arise in different locations when material 
is posted online. From the perspective of claimants, this means that a range of different 
applicable laws might govern a defamation action arising from a single online 
                                              
35 It should be noted that, unlike the homonymous rule applicable in some US states (discussed below), the 
‘single publication’ rule adopted in the United Kingdom under s.8 of the Defamation Act 2013 only affects the 
expiry of the time limit to bring proceedings, which runs from the ‘first publication’ (as defined). 
36 A special jurisdictional rule has been adopted by the CJEU for online defamation, allowing a claimant to sue 
for worldwide damages in the claimant’s own ‘centre of interests’: Case C-509/09, eDate Advertising v X [2012] 
QB 654. 
  
 
 
communication. Even if a single court can be seised of all these claims, the claimant may still 
need to prove the content of the applicable law in each place in which their reputation has 
been damaged to be fully compensated, which may be prohibitively expensive.37 This 
‘fragmentation’ of the law governing a tort where it leads to damage in different jurisdictions, 
known as the ‘mosaic effect’,38 is not unique to communications online, but it is a problem 
which is particularly acute in this context. 
 
From the perspective of defendants, a territorial rule based on the place of damage seems 
equally problematic but in a very different way. It is true that a small number of English 
publications should be reflected in a relatively small damages award based on the application 
of English law. But any award of damages is likely to lead to the withdrawal of many online 
publications, as very few such publications make sufficient profit in other jurisdictions to 
overcome the imposition of damages in relation to even a relatively insignificant publication 
in England. In addition, a claimant will frequently ask the court for an order enjoining future 
publication of the defamatory material.39 Even if this order is limited to publication in 
England, compliance with such an order in the online context may well require removal of 
the material from the internet altogether. The effect of this is that it risks a publication being 
regulated by the lowest common denominator of free speech protection, at least among states 
whose judgments will be practically effective against the defendant. To put this another way, 
a rule based on the place of damage risks leading to an over-projection of the public policy of 
each state in which the material is published, as each state may effectively restrain the 
                                              
37 Courts may also be reluctant to presume that foreign defamation law, if unproven, is the same as local law, 
given its special ‘public’ function of free speech regulation – see eg National Auto Glass Supplies (Australia) 
Pty Limited v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Limited (No 8) [2007] FCA 1625 (Australia); Al-Misnad v 
Azzaman [2003] EWHC 1783 (QB). 
38 See further, eg, Alex Mills, ‘The Application of Multiple Laws under the Rome II Regulation’ in John Ahern 
and William Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A 
New International Litigation Regime (Brill 2009). 
39 See, for example, s 13 of the Defamation Act 2013. 
  
 
 
publication worldwide. Thus, the internet may be viewed not only as a mechanism through 
which communication travels freely, but also a mechanism through which regulation of that 
communication may itself be ‘communicated’ readily across borders. A rule which applied 
the law of the claimant’s place of residence (such as that notably adopted in China in 201040) 
would similarly purport to project those standards of free speech protection globally, without 
regard for the interests and expectations of publishers in other jurisdictions.41 
 
A territorial rule based on the place of the defendant’s actions would obviously be far more 
attractive to defendants – the standard of free speech protection which would apply to their 
communications would (at least generally) be their ‘home’ law (as it would be more 
obviously should the choice of law rule select that law directly). From the perspective of 
claimants, however, such a rule would appear to lead to a problematic under-projection of the 
public policy of other states. Indeed, any similar US-style42 attempt to aggregate all the 
damage caused by an online communication under a single governing law (whether based on 
the place in which the material was uploaded, or the first or main place in which it was read, 
or the place with which the tort is ‘most closely connected’) would seem to underplay the 
importance which each legal order attaches to regulating communications within its territory. 
                                              
40 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations (2010), 
English translation by LU Song, China Foreign Affairs University <http://conflictoflaws.net/News/2011/01/PIL-
China.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016; also available at Lu Song, ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Laws Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations (full text)’ (2013) 1 Chin J Comp Law 185: 
Article 46. Infringement via Internet or by other means of personality rights such as right to name, right 
to image, right of reputation and privacy right are governed by the law of the habitual residence of the 
victim. 
41 This is similar to the jurisdictional rule adopted by the CJEU in the context of online defamation (see n 36 
above), but has quite different effects in the context of choice of law. 
42 In the United States, the ‘single publication’ rule began as a jurisdictional principle, to avoid multiplicity of 
suits, but has also frequently been interpreted to function as a choice of law rule – since only one tort arises out 
of a publication, including on the internet, it is considered that there can only be one governing law. Under the 
Uniform Single Publication Act, applicable in many US states, a single publication in multiple places is 
considered to constitute only a single cause of action, and courts generally apply the law of the claimant’s place 
of domicile in defamation cases, following the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, s 150. See Laura E 
Little, ‘Internet Defamation, Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the 
United States’ (2012) 14 YB Private Int’l L; Lori A Wood, ‘Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule’ 
(2001) 81 BUL Rev 895. 
  
 
 
Choosing the place where the publisher acted, for example, would seem almost inevitably to 
promote a ‘race to the bottom’ in protection of reputation terms, with publishers choosing to 
base their internet operations in the most favourable jurisdiction.  
 
Doubts must also be placed on the helpfulness of a choice of law rule (such as that proposed 
by the European Parliament in relation to defamation generally, as examined in section 3.4 
above) which seeks to resolve these questions by identifying the legal order to which a 
communication is targeted or directed, whether based on the intentions of the publisher or the 
actual audience of the communication.43 An internet publication may frequently not be 
targeted to any particular jurisdiction, and it may equally be foreseeable that it will be 
available to be read in almost any jurisdiction.44  
 
A similar analysis might be applied to the adoption of a choice of law rule which looked to 
the law common to the parties, whether based on nationality, domicile or residence. In cases 
where the claimant’s reputation and the communication nevertheless cross borders, applying 
the parties’ common law would seem to be an over-projection of that law, and an under-
projection of the law of the other places of the communication and reputation. If one English 
party defames another English party in the United States, the application of English law 
seems to underplay the context and the political community within which this communication 
takes place. 
 
                                              
43 See further eg Csongor István Nagy, ‘The Word is a Dangerous Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed and New Opportunities’ (2012) 8 J  Priv Int’l L 251. 
44 See similarly King v Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329 [33]-[34]; Young v New Haven Advocate, 315 F3d 256 
(4thCir 2002) (finding for jurisdictional purposes that a publication on the internet was not sufficiently directed 
toward the forum state). See Little (2012) (n 42). 
  
 
 
4.3. Legal and political indeterminacy in regulating online defamation 
So where does this analysis leave choice of law for online defamation? Two reasons for the 
failure to adopt a more ‘modern’ choice of law rule may be highlighted. The first is that, in 
comparison with most subject areas of law which are regulated by private international law, 
the law of defamation has a stronger public dimension. It is, indeed, notable that many legal 
systems deal with defamation through criminal as well as tort law. The public dimension of 
the law of defamation – the fact that it must balance private reputation rights against the 
freedom of speech which is considered necessary for a particular political or social order – is 
part of the explanation for the continued application of the double-actionability rule, which 
partially preserves the common law’s traditional public regulatory perspective on choice of 
law in tort.  
 
The other main explanation for the continuation of the double-actionability rule is the 
difficulty in formulating any alternative rule, a difficulty which is exacerbated in the online 
context. What the above analysis suggests is that the choice of which law should govern 
cross-border defamation, particularly online, is not a matter of legal ‘rationality’ but a matter 
of policy. Favouring the law of uploading means favouring free speech at a global level – the 
‘race to the top’ which will occur as publishers locate and act in the jurisdiction which is 
most favourable to them. Favouring the law of downloading means favouring reputation 
protection at a global level – the ‘race to the bottom’ (in free speech terms) which will occur 
as claimants bring proceedings in the jurisdiction and based on the law applicable which is 
most favourable to them. The reason the issue of the law applicable to cross-border 
defamation (particularly online) is so difficult to ‘solve’ in legal terms may be that it is not 
solvable, but rather inherently reflects a contest of competing substantive values.  
 
  
 
 
 
5. Choice of law in defamation on social media 
This chapter now narrows its focus again to social media, considering whether there is 
anything particular or characteristic about the social media context which suggests a different 
approach to determining the law which should govern a claim in cross-border defamation.  
 
As discussed in the introduction above, the democratization of mass communication through 
social media increases the risk of defamation cases arising from social media – there already 
appears, for example, to be a growing number of cases in the English courts dealing with 
alleged defamation involving Twitter.45 The fact that individuals may carelessly or recklessly 
be exposed to defamation proceedings through social media does suggest the need to balance 
the interests of claimants and defendants carefully. In the world of social media, defendants 
are not necessarily large media organisations, and they will not necessarily have the 
knowledge or resources to resist challenges to their free speech rights – let alone to do so 
under foreign law.  
 
Part of the solution to this problem could be the effective ‘editorialization’ of internet 
content, through a requirement that operators exercise a censorship function over content 
posted through their services, making them a more attractive ‘target’ of litigation (and 
defender of free speech).46 This would, however, impose a significant burden on social media 
sites, essentially requiring them to act more like traditional media organisations. The 
                                              
45 Including, for example, Barron MP v Collins MEP [2015] EWHC 1125 (QB); The Bussey Law Firm PC v 
Page [2015] EWHC 563 (QB); Johnson v Steele [2014] EWHC B24 (QB); Reachlocal UK Ltd v Bennett [2014] 
EWHC 3405 (QB); Coulson v Wilby [2014] EWHC 3404 (QB); Mole v Hunter [2014] EWHC 658 (QB); 
Kearns v Kemp & Anor [2013] EWHC 4093 (QB); Mama Group Ltd v Sinclair [2013] EWHC 2374 (QB); 
McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB); Cruddas v Adams [2013] EWHC 145 (QB); McCann v Bennett 
[2013] EWHC 283 (QB); and Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB). 
46 As under the Defamation Act 1996, s 1 – see Tamiz v Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68; Kearns v Kemp; Twitter, 
Inc [2013] EWHC 4093 (QB). 
  
 
 
approach adopted in UK regulation recently has thus been quite different – under the 
Defamation Act 2013, web site providers will generally not be liable for material posted 
through services they provide, even if they moderate those services.47 
 
Many of these issues arise regardless of whether the communication has a cross-border 
element – the issue of whether social media should be regulated as media arises even if all the 
actors are within a single state. But particular problems arise where such an element exists, as 
it easily might for social media communications which readily cross porous national 
boundaries. As examined above, the basic policy difficulty which presents itself for cross-
border online defamation is that localizing the tort through a territorial rule appears both too 
broad and too narrow. It is too broad in the sense that it extends the application of the legal 
order which is chosen to cover other territorial places connected to the communication. A 
territorial rule is also too narrow in the sense that it isolates a single choice of law rule for a 
communication which is at least partially carried out within a distinct foreign political and 
legal order. Indeed, applying the law of the place of download leads to the potential 
application of numerous laws to a single communication, as each place of download potential 
establishes a distinct tort. 
 
These apparently unsolvable problems invite consideration of a more radical solution. In 
some contexts, there is an apparent need to localize defamation to a particular state, 
particularly where it is the party’s ‘offline’ reputation which is at stake, and that reputation is 
based within a certain territorial community. But it might be questioned whether this is or 
should always be the case. A characteristic feature of social media is that it permits 
widespread communication by individuals to an audience which is potentially the world as a 
                                              
47 Defamation Act 2013, s 5; note also s 10. 
  
 
 
whole, but also potentially a defined social group or network. The communication may thus 
be constrained to a particular ‘community’ which only exists online. In order to avoid the 
apparent arbitrariness of applying territorial rules, and the ‘mosaic effect’48 of potentially 
having to apply a large number of national laws to the communication, it might be suggested 
that the ‘realm’ of social media (as a whole or in part) could itself be conceptualised as a 
distinct political community or social ordering. To put this another way, if the law of 
defamation is partially involved in protecting public interests, could we consider adopting a 
non-territorial state conception of the relevant ‘public’ within which a reputation exists and 
has allegedly been damaged?49 
 
This idea perhaps risks echoing the apparently misplaced idealism of 1990s assertions of a 
distinct and de-territorialised ‘law of cyberspace’.50 But it is not entirely far-fetched. The 
Rome II Regulation (which as noted above excludes defamation) already anticipates the 
possibility that parties might, at least in limited circumstances, themselves choose the law 
which governs a claim in tort between them.51 The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts permit the parties to choose non-state law to govern their 
contractual relations,52 embracing the growing recognition (or at least discussion) of 
‘transnational law’.53 Loosely combining these considerations, it is not unimaginable that the 
contract for a social media platform might require the parties to agree that their 
communications would be governed by a particular standard of free speech, which would not 
                                              
48 See Mills, ‘The Application of Multiple Laws’ (n 30). 
49 See more generally David S Ardia, ‘Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law’ (2010) 45 Harv CR-CLL Rev 261; Cedric Ryngaert and Mark Zoetekouw, ‘The End of 
Territory? The Re-Emergence of Community as a Principle of Jurisdictional Order in the Internet Era’ (2014) 
Working Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2523354> accessed 3 June 2016. 
50 See eg David R Johnson and David G Post, ‘Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 
Stan L Rev 1367. See Andrew Murray, Chapter XX in this volume for further discussion of this work. 
51 Art 14. 
52 Art 3 <www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=135> accessed 3 June 2016.  
53 See generally eg Peer Zumbansen, Günther Handl and Joachim Zekoll (eds), Beyond Territoriality. 
Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Brill 2012). 
  
 
 
necessarily need to be tied to the standard of any particular state. This approach would also 
potentially be supported by the idea, examined previously in this chapter, that tort law may be 
principally concerned with regulating an existing legal relationship – with or without a cross-
border element, such a relationship may not be centred around any state legal or social order, 
but around the social (and potentially legal and contractual) order established within the 
social media platform. Private arbitral tribunals already commonly regulate disputes over 
contracts which are governed by non-state law,54 and arbitral awards based on the application 
of non-state law are readily enforced by the English courts.55  
 
Social media organisations are in fact already heavily engaged in regulating aspects of free 
speech themselves, particularly through censorship of communications deemed to be 
offensive, and do not necessarily apply any national law in doing this. It is, for example, 
notable that Facebook regulates content through application of a set of ‘Community 
Standards’ which ‘aim to find the right balance between giving people a place to express 
themselves and promoting a welcoming and safe environment for everyone’56 – replicating 
the function of national law rather than referring or deferring to it.57 A prominent non-
governmental organisation focused on the rights of internet users has expressed the concern 
                                              
54 Special online dispute resolution processes have also been developed in some cases, for example, by eBay and 
Amazon – see further eg Thomas Schultz, ‘Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach Legal 
Theorists’ (2007) 10 Yale J L & Tech 151; David P Baron, ‘Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay 
Community of Traders’ (2002) 4 Bus & Pol 245. 
55 Note the Arbitration Act 1996, s 46; see, eg, Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH at al v The 
Government of the State of R’as Al Khaimah and The R’as Al Khaimah Oil Company (‘the Rakoil Case’) [1987] 
2 All ER, pp 769-84 (reversed on other grounds at [1990] 1 AC 295); Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour 
Beatty Constructions Ltd [1993] AC 334; Musawi v RE International (UK) Ltd [2007] EWHC 2981 (Ch); 
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. On the possibility of ‘non-state law’ 
see further generally Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality: Stateless Law and International Arbitration 
(OUP 2014). 
56 Facebook, ‘Community Standards’ <www.facebook.com/communitystandards/?letter> accessed 3 June 2016.  
57 See ibid: ‘Because of the diversity of our global community, please bear in mind that something that may be 
disagreeable or disturbing to you may not violate our Community Standards’. The terms and conditions on 
Facebook also provide that they are governed by the laws of the State of California, and contain an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement in favour of ‘the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court 
located in San Mateo County’ (Facebook, ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ 
<www.facebook.com/legal/terms> accessed 3 June 2016). The agreement does not purport, however, to define 
the law or forum applicable to disputes between users.  
  
 
 
that “Facebook has become a sort of parallel justice with its own rules that we cannot fully 
understand.”58 Free speech on Facebook, in a practical sense, is thus regulated not principally 
through private law defamation claims, but through removal of content based on application 
of Facebook’s own (somewhat unclear) quasi-administrative standards.59  
 
It is by no means suggested that this idea of a non-state public online realm, with its own 
standards of speech protection, is unproblematic. For example, if it is to be based on 
contractual consent then its application will be limited to situations in which the claimant and 
defendant to proceedings are both members of the same social media platform, within which 
the claimant’s reputation has been damaged. Perhaps more critically, this idea would seem to 
constitute (or at least recognise) a potentially problematic transfer of regulatory power from 
the public sphere to the private. It is not self-evident that the benefits of recognising non-state 
community standards (such as avoiding apparently arbitrary or multiple territorial laws) 
outweigh the seemingly alarming consequences of the fact that this would empower 
corporations such as Facebook or Twitter to determine the limits of free speech on their 
platforms (or rather enhance the extent to which they already do so in reality), displacing 
norms which may be generated through more participatory and democratic processes.60 One 
concern is that the rules on a social media platform or their enforcement could readily 
become politicised, although it must also be remembered that national law control over social 
                                              
58 Leo Kelion, ‘Facebook Wipes Page Saying Soldiers Should Be Murdered’ (BBC News, 8 April 2014) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26938007> accessed 3 June 2016, quoting a representative of ‘Squaring the 
Net’ (La Quadrature du Net: Internet and Libertés <www.laquadrature.net/> accessed 3 June 2016). 
59 Facebook, ‘Community Standards’ (n 55) provides that ‘We allow you to speak freely on matters and people 
of public interest, but remove content that appears to purposefully target private individuals with the intention of 
degrading or shaming them’. They appear to take a different approach, however, in relation to ‘public figures’, 
providing that ‘We permit open and critical discussion of people who are featured in the news or have a large 
public audience based on their profession or chosen activities’, although also noting that ‘We remove credible 
threats to public figures, as well as hate speech directed at them – just as we do for private individuals’.   
60 See generally eg Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World (Penguin 2012). 
  
 
 
media does not in any way guarantee its depoliticisation – as events in Russia in relation to 
VKontakte (Russia’s most popular social media platform) may appear to suggest.61 
 
Given this range of concerns, this chapter does not advocate the recognition of non-state 
norms to govern cross-border defamation in place of national laws, let alone claim that 
existing positive law quite allows for this type of analysis. But non-state private regulation of 
social media is already taking place far more commonly and effectively than regulation by 
national law and institutions, and lawyers and legal academics ignore such realities at their 
peril. The problems and the example discussed above highlight that the issues posed by cross-
border defamation on social media are deeper than merely practical problems – they are 
potentially problems which challenge our very idea of a political community within which a 
reputation may exist and speech may be regulated, and they are worth taking seriously.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
As choice of law in tort has developed through UK statutory reform and European 
harmonisation, choice of law in defamation has been left behind, continuing to be subject to 
the traditional common law double-actionability rule. In part this is because there remain 
doubts about the appropriateness of adopting any rule which approaches choice of law in 
defamation purely as a matter of private law, without recognising the important public 
significance of the regulation of free speech in a political community. In part it is also 
because agreeing on any new rule has proven extremely difficult. Even offline, adopting any 
                                              
61 See eg ‘Russian Social Network Founder Says He Has Been Fired’ (BBC News, 22 April 2014) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27113292> accessed 3 June 2016 (‘The founder of Russia’s most popular 
social network site says he has been fired and that allies of President Putin have taken over his site.’); Marc 
Scott, ‘Mail.ru Takes Full Ownership of VKontakte, Russia’s Largest Social Network’ (The New York Times, 16 
September 2014) <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/mail-ru-takes-full-ownership-of-vkontakte-russias-
largest-social-network/> accessed 3 June 2016.   
  
 
 
territorial rule to determine the law which governs a cross-border claim in defamation 
appears problematic, whether the tort is determined to be located at the place of damage or 
the place of the wrongful act. The former potentially leads to a multiplicity of laws and the 
risk that any given law will be over-projected through injunctive relief, and thus a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms of free speech protection. The latter leads to a single law which is likely to 
favour the publisher, and thus a ‘race to the top’ in terms of free speech protection, and the 
over-projection of that law into other political communities. Online, the problems are 
multiplied, as the internet may spread regulation as readily as it spreads information, and 
communication is less likely to be targeted or directed to any particular audience. The 
‘solution’ to these problems appears, in the final analysis, to belong to the realm of policy 
rather than technique, based on whether the risk of damaging free speech is considered to 
outweigh the risk of harm to private reputations. The difficulties in resolving these questions 
mean that defamation online is a twenty first century problem which remains regulated by a 
nineteenth century rule – but it might be argued, perhaps surprisingly, that this is 
appropriately so. 
 
The addition of social media to this issue creates not only further complexity and practical 
problems, but also potentially a more fundamental challenge. As people increasingly 
maintain and rely on personal and business connections online, it may be that the application 
of territorial rules to connect their communications or reputations to national legal orders 
becomes increasingly difficult and arbitrary. The more challenging suggestion this raises is 
that, at least in some circumstances, the relevant political community which defamation law 
should seek to protect is an online community, not a territorial state community. Exactly how 
such a legal order could be constructed or recognised – or indeed whether it should be at all – 
is a question whose full exploration is beyond the scope of this chapter. But if social media 
  
 
 
platforms are, as it is often claimed, changing the way we live our lives, so that our social 
organisation is ordered around online groups rather than within territorial ‘neighbourhood’ 
social circles, then we should take seriously the proposition that this could also change the 
way we identify and regulate ourselves within legal orders, perhaps bringing choice of law 
into the twenty-first century world of social media. 
